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S.: Vendor-Purchaser--Rights of Defaulting Purchaser
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
to purchases and sales will correctly reflect income except an accrual method...."
The courts must choose between two alternatives: (1) allow
the taxpayer to escape taxation when he changes from a cash basis
to an accrual basis of reporting his income, or (2) deny the taxpayer
the right to report properly his income for the first year of the
change from a cash basis to an accrual basis. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111,
§ 29.22 (c)-l (1943), provides that "In order to reflect the income
correctly, inventories at the beginning and end of each taxable
year are necessary in every case in which the production, purchase,
or sale of merchandise is an income-producing factor. ..."
The Welp case refuses to draw the fine distinction found in the
Hardy and Schuyler cases. If the courts are going to allow the
taxpayer to benefit from the change then they should not distinguish between how the books were kept, denying relief to those
whose books were kept on a cash basis and aiding those who kept
their books on an accrual basis. Although an accrual basis more
accurately reflects income when inventories are maintained, such
method of accounting does not properly reflect the taxable income,
which is the government's prime interest, when reported on a cash
basis.
J. M. H.

VENDOR-PURCHASER-RIGHTS

OF DEFAULTING

PURCHASER.-Oral

contract between P and D under which D agreed to sell land to P,
the latter making part payment. Subsequently, the parties were
unable to agree upon the balance due; whereupon D refused to give
a deed unless P paid an amount in excess of what P claimed was
due. P refused to pay and made motion for judgment for money
had and received by D who counterclaimed for balance due. The
lower court entered judment for D. On appeal, held, that the
judgment should be reversed since the contract was unenforceable
under the statute of frauds, and both parties were in default in
performance thereof. The purchaser should be allowed to recover
the part payment. Ballangee v. Whitlock, 74 S.E.2d 780 (W. Va.
1953).
It is not the purpose of this comment to deal with the question
which was before the court in the principal case but rather with
the converse thereof. That is, can a defaulting purchaser recover
his part payment, when because of his default the vendor terminates the contract or brings an action for damages?
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STUDENT NOTES
It seems to be a rather well settled rule that such a defaulter
cannot recover money which he has voluntarily paid, when the
vendor is not in default. Berger v. Victory Realty Tr. Co, 106 N.E.2d
429 (Mass. 1952); McEnaney v. Spedick, 13 N.J.S 37, 80 A.2d 237
(1951); Stewart v. Elkins, 101 W. Va. 557, 133 S.E. 125 (1926).
It appears that the general rule is unsound as applied to a
vendor who does not ask for specific performance, but retains the
title and acquiesces in the abandonment of performance. He
should be allowed any damages he may have sustained, but not a
grossly arbitrary penalty. It is certainly questionable whether, in
the absence of a provision for forfeiture which is deemed valid, he
should be permitted to retain all the purchase money, wholly with.
out reference to the amount of his actual damage. The inequity
is further pointed up when it is realized that if a purchaser has
committed a total breach of his contract, having rendered no performance thereunder, no penalty or forfeiture will be enforced
against him. All he must do is make the injured party whole
through the payment of damages. While, on the other hand, a
vendee who has rendered part performance and then breached his
contract must lose all of that sum, irrespective of the damages
suffered by the vendor. We thus have the anomalous situation in
which a party who has almost fully performed is penalized more
heavily than one who has performed none or only a small part of his
contract.
It is submitted that the general rule which is to the effect that
a vendee who repudiates his contract without legal excuse is not
entitled to recover from the vendor money paid in part performance
of an executory contract, should be subject to at least one exception.
This exception is the doctrine of unjust enrichment, which, being
equitable in character, permits recovery in certain instances where
a person has received from another a benefit the retention of which
would be unjust.
With an instinctive revolt against making the vendor more
than whole as a result of the vendee's default and with the law's
natural opposition to penalties and forfeiture, a steadily increasing
trend away from the strict application of the general rule has
sprung up. This opposition is evidenced by the cases of Smith v.
Wolf, 50 Ga. App. 19, 176 S.E. 889 (1934) and Dooley v. Stillson,
46 R.I. 332, 128 At. 217 (1925). In the former it was held that
although the purchaser has rescinded the contract, still if the vendor
retakes the land without legal procedure, the purchaser can recover his partial payment, less damages occasioned by his breach,
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and less the fair rental value of the land. The latter case stated
that the vendor may not retain any part of the purchase money
greater than the difference between the contract price and the
actual value, as he may not profit by the purchaser's misfortune in
being unable to complete the agreement.
Illustrating the law's opposition to forfeiture and penalties is
the case of Freedman v. St. Mathias Parish, 37 Cal.2d 16, 230 P.2d
629 (1951). There it was held that if the denial of part restitution
of the down payment would result in the imposition of punitive
damages even a defaulting purchaser is entitled to relief.
Cases denying restitution can be justified on one or more of
the following grounds: (1) defendant has not rescinded and is
ready willing and able to perform; (2) plaintiff has not shown that
the injury caused by his breach is less than the installments paid;
or (3) there is a genuine and valid liquidated damages provision in
the contract stating that defendant may retain money so paid in
part performance. If none of these justifications exists-restitution
should be allowed. See Corbin, Right of Defaulting Vendee to the
Restitution of Instalments Paid, 40 YALE L.J. 1013 (1931).
In permitting restitution to a defaulting vendee the courts, of
course, should not be unmindful of the rights of the vendor arising
out of the contract. On the contrary "every contractual right of
the vendor should be scrupulously preserved, but in cutting the
pound of flesh no blood must be shed." Melberg v. Bough, 62
Utah 331, 218 Pac. 975 (1923).
C. F. S., Jr.

WILLS-VOID RFsIDUARY-INTEsTAcY-RIGHT OF NONRENOUNCING

SPOUSE To SHARE.-Testatrix died leaving a will which devised a
life estate in designated realty to her surviving husband, with a
remainder over. The husband died without having renounced the
will. The administrator of the testatrix sued for a construction of
the will. Upon petition, nearest blood relatives of the testatrLx
were granted leave to intervene and file an answer and cross bill.
The trial court, after holding the remainder void, declared that
the husband being the paramount heir at law, took the remainder
which passed by intestacy. Interveners appealed. Held, that a
spouse who is a paramount heir under the descent and distribution
statutes does not waive his right to intestate property, resulting
from failure of the residuary clause, by failing to renounce the will.
Harmer v. Boggess, 73 S.E.2d 264 (W. Va. 1952).
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